Analysis of American Classic Cases | Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump 607 U.S. ___学习资源公司诉特朗普案 (2026)

学习资源公司诉特朗普案（Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump）是2026年2月20日美国联邦最高法院作出的极具里程碑意义的判决。该案的核心问题是：总统是否可以依据《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA），在宣布国家紧急状态后单方面征收大规模关税。该案合并审理了两个相关案件，背景是特朗普在第二任期内对多个国家的进口商品普遍加征关税，引发广泛争议。众多企业提出质疑，认为总统的相关措施已超越其法定权限。

最终，联邦最高法院以6比3的多数意见裁定，虽然《国际紧急经济权力法》授权总统“监管进口”，但这一表述并不包括征税权。根据联邦宪法第一条第八款，征税和设定关税的权力属于国会；如果国会要将此项权力授予总统，必须以明确的立法语言加以规定。由于该法没有作出这样的明确授权，相关关税措施被认定为越权。

该判决的意义主要体现在三个方面：第一，明确了紧急经济权力的宪法边界，防止行政机关以“国家紧急状态”为由扩大征税权，强化权力分立原则；第二，确立了“重大经济权力必须有明确授权”的解释标准，对总统在贸易和经济领域行使紧急权力形成约束；第三，对美国关税政策的法律框架产生深远影响，也为受影响企业寻求救济提供了重要依据。总体来看，本案被视为限制行政权扩张、重申国会在税收与关税领域核心地位的重要判例。

The consolidated cases arose from executive action taken by President Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Following a declared national emergency, the President issued executive measures invoking IEEPA’s authorization to “regulate . . . importation,” and, on that basis, directed modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) that imposed substantial tariffs on specified imported goods. The measures were sweeping in scope, affecting a broad range of importers and altering the applicable tariff classifications and rates through executive action rather than through a tariff statute enacted by Congress.

该合并审理的案件源于特朗普总统以其官方身份，依据《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）采取的一系列行政措施。在宣布国家紧急状态后，总统援引该法所赋予的“监管……进口”权力，下令修改《美国协调关税表》（HTSUS），对特定进口商品加征大幅关税。这些措施适用范围广泛，影响大量进口商，并且没有通过国会制定的关税立法实施，而是以行政命令的方式直接改变了关税分类和税率。

The petitioners in No. 24–1287, including Learning Resources, Inc., are private businesses that import goods subject to the challenged tariffs. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the President lacked statutory authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs and seeking injunctive relief. The Government moved to transfer the action to the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the CIT possessed exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions “arising out of” laws providing for tariffs or their administration. The District Court denied the transfer motion and granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Before the case proceeded through the ordinary appellate process, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari before judgment.

第24–1287号案的原告包括学习资源公司（Learning Resources, Inc.）等多家私人企业，这些企业进口的商品受到涉案关税的影响。原告向哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院提起诉讼，主张总统无权依据《国际紧急经济权力法》征收关税，并请求法院发布禁令，阻止相关措施继续实施。政府随后申请将案件移送至美国国际贸易法院（CIT），理由是凡因关税法律或其执行而产生的民事案件，均属该法院专属管辖。地区法院驳回移送申请，并签发初步禁令，认定《国际紧急经济权力法》未授权总统征收关税。在案件尚未依通常程序进入上诉阶段之前，联邦最高法院批准了“判决前调卷令”（certiorari before judgment），决定直接受理本案。

In No. 25–250, V.O.S. Selections and other plaintiffs, including several States, filed suit directly in the United States Court of International Trade, challenging the same tariff measures. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs of the kind challenged. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part. The Federal Circuit agreed that the CIT possessed exclusive jurisdiction and further concluded that the statutory text and structure of IEEPA do not confer tariff authority on the President.

在第25–250号案中，V.O.S. 甄选酒业公司及其他原告（包括若干州政府）直接向美国国际贸易法院（CIT）提起诉讼，挑战同一批关税措施。国际贸易法院作出有利于原告的简易判决，认定《国际紧急经济权力法》并未授权总统征收本案所涉类型的关税。随后，联邦巡回上诉法院以全体法官审理（en banc）的形式，在相关部分维持原判。上诉法院不仅确认国际贸易法院对此类案件享有专属管辖权，还进一步指出，从《国际紧急经济权力法》的文本及整体结构来看，并不能推导出总统拥有征收关税的权力。

Given the overlapping legal questions and the substantial national importance of the issues presented, the Supreme Court of the United States granted expedited review, consolidated the two cases.

鉴于两案涉及的法律问题高度重叠，且争议具有重大的全国性影响，联邦最高法院决定加快审理，并将两案合并处理。

1. Whether the United States Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions challenging tariffs imposed by the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, thereby depriving the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of jurisdiction in No. 24–1287.

美国国际贸易法院是否对针对总统依据《国际紧急经济权力法》征收关税而提起的民事诉讼享有专属管辖权，从而排除哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院在第24–1287号案中的管辖权。

2. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorizes the President of the United States to impose tariffs based on its authorization to “regulate … importation.”

《国际紧急经济权力法》是否基于其授权“监管……进口”的条款，赋予美国总统征收关税的权力。

3. If such authority would carry extraordinary economic and political significance, whether the statute provides the clear congressional authorization required under the major questions doctrine.

如果该项权力具有重大的经济和政治影响，《国际紧急经济权力法》是否依据“重大问题原则”（Major-questions doctrine）提供了国会所要求的明确授权。

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; … To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

—— U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8

“国会有权课征并收取税款、关税、进口税和消费税，以清偿债务，并为合众国提供共同防务和普遍福利；但所有关税、进口税和消费税应在合众国范围内保持统一；有权以合众国的信用借款；有权管理与外国、各州之间以及与印第安部落之间的商业；……有权制定一切为执行上述各项权力以及本宪法赋予合众国政府或其任何部门或官员的其他权力所必需且适当的法律。”

——联邦宪法第一条第八款

“Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”

——International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)

“本编第1702条授予总统的任何权力，如总统就某一异常且特殊的威胁宣布国家紧急状态，且该威胁全部或在实质上源自美国境外，并对美国的国家安全、外交政策或经济构成影响，则可为应对该威胁而行使该等权力。”

——《美国法典》第50编（《国际紧急经济权力法》）第1701(a)条

“The President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise— … investigate, regulate, or prohibit— … (B) … importation or exportation of currency or securities …”

—— International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)

“总统可以在其自行制定的规章之下，通过发布指示、颁发许可或采取其他方式——……调查、监管或者禁止——……（B）……货币或证券的进口或出口……”

——《美国法典》第50编（《国际紧急经济权力法》）第1702(a)(1)(B)条

The plaintiffs argued that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President of the United States to impose tariffs. They maintained that the constitutional power to lay and collect “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” belongs to Congress, and that tariff-setting is a core legislative function that cannot be inferred from general statutory language.

原告主张，《国际紧急经济权力法》并未授权美国总统征收关税。他们认为，征收“税款、关税、进口税和消费税”的宪法权力属于国会，而设定关税属于立法机关的核心职能，不能从概括性的法条用语中推定得出。

They contended that IEEPA’s authorization to “regulate . . . importation” does not include the power to impose duties. In their view, Congress has historically granted tariff authority through explicit statutory provisions that specify rates, limits, or conditions. They emphasized that IEEPA contains no reference to “tariffs,” “duties,” or revenue-raising authority, and that reading the statute to authorize tariffs would transform a general regulatory statute into a broad delegation of taxing power.

他们进一步主张，《国际紧急经济权力法》授权的“监管……进口”并不包括征收关税。在他们看来，国会历来在授予关税权时，都会通过明确的成文法条款加以规定，并具体列明税率、范围或适用条件。该法既未提及“关税”“税费”，也未涉及筹集财政收入的权力；若将其解释为授权征收关税，无异于把一部一般性的监管法律扩张为对征税权的广泛授权。

The plaintiffs further argued that the challenged tariffs were sweeping in scope and duration, affecting broad categories of goods and imposing substantial financial burdens on importers. They asserted that such authority, if intended, would require clear congressional authorization. In addition, in the case filed in the Court of International Trade, the plaintiffs maintained that challenges to tariff measures arise under laws providing for tariffs and therefore fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court.

原告还指出，涉案关税在适用范围和持续时间上都十分广泛，涉及大量商品类别，并给进口商带来沉重的经济负担。他们认为，如欲赋予总统如此重大的权力，必须有国会明确授权。此外，在向美国国际贸易法院提起的案件中，原告进一步主张，对该等关税措施的挑战本质上源于关税法律，因此应当属于该法院的专属管辖范围。

The United States, on behalf of President Trump in his official capacity, defended the tariffs as a lawful exercise of authority under IEEPA. The Government argued that the statute’s grant of power to “regulate . . . importation” is broad and encompasses measures that control or condition the entry of goods into the United States, including the imposition of duties.

美国联邦政府以特朗普总统的官方身份为其辩护，主张相关关税措施是依据《国际紧急经济权力法》合法行使的权力。政府认为，该法所赋予的“监管……进口”权力范围广泛，涵盖对进入美国的商品进行控制或设定条件的各种措施，其中包括征收关税。

The Government maintained that tariffs function as regulatory tools affecting trade flows and economic relationships, particularly in the context of a declared national emergency. It asserted that Congress, in enacting IEEPA, conferred flexible and comprehensive authority on the President to respond to foreign threats, and that nothing in the statutory text excludes tariff measures from that authority.

联邦政府认为，关税本质上是一种调控工具，可以影响贸易流向和经济关系，尤其是在宣布国家紧急状态的情况下更具意义。政府主张，国会在制定《国际紧急经济权力法》时，意在赋予总统灵活而广泛的权力，以应对来自外国的威胁；而法条文本中并未明确将关税措施排除在该授权范围之外。

With respect to jurisdiction in No. 24–1287, the Government argued that the action could proceed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and was not confined to the Court of International Trade, notwithstanding that the challenged measures modified the Harmonized Tariff Schedule.

关于第24–1287号案的管辖权问题，联邦政府主张，即便相关措施涉及修改《美国协调关税表》，本案仍可由哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院审理，而不属于美国国际贸易法院的专属管辖范围。

联邦最高法院首先审视了国会所确立的法定管辖框架。法院指出，根据《美国法典》第28编第1581条(i)(1)款，凡针对美国提起、且因任何“规定关税”的法律或其“管理与执行”而产生的民事案件，均由美国国际贸易法院专属管辖。

The Court then identified the operative legal mechanism challenged in both cases. Although the Learning Resources plaintiffs filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and framed their claim as a statutory challenge to Presidential action under IEEPA, the tariffs were implemented through modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. Those modifications, by statute, are treated as statutory provisions affecting import treatment.

随后，法院指出，两案实质上针对的是同一法律机制。尽管在第24–1287号案中，学习资源公司等原告向哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院起诉，并将争议表述为对总统依据《国际紧急经济权力法》采取行政行为的挑战，但相关关税是通过修改《美国协调关税表》实施的。依照法律规定，此类修改具有成文法效力，属于直接影响进口待遇的法律规定。

From that statutory chain, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily arise out of a law providing for tariffs, because the injury alleged and the relief sought turn on the alteration of tariff classifications and rates. The forum question therefore does not depend on how the complaint is styled, but on the legal source of the challenged tariff treatment.

基于上述法定框架，法院认为，原告的主张本质上源于一部“规定关税”的法律，因为其所主张的损害和请求的救济均取决于关税分类和税率的调整。因此，关于审理法院的选择，并不取决于起诉状如何表述，而应取决于所争议关税待遇的法律依据。

Because Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction over such claims in the Court of International Trade, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in No. 24–1287. The Court accordingly vacated that judgment and directed dismissal. In contrast, the case filed in the Court of International Trade properly fell within that court’s exclusive jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit’s exercise of appellate review was therefore proper.

由于国会已将此类案件的专属管辖权授予美国国际贸易法院，第24–1287号案中的地区法院不具备案件管辖权。最高法院因此撤销该判决，并指示以缺乏管辖权为由予以驳回。相反，直接向美国国际贸易法院提起的案件正属于该法院的专属管辖范围，因此联邦巡回上诉法院对其进行上诉审查亦属适当。

The Court began by situating the asserted authority within the constitutional allocation of powers. It emphasized that the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to lay and collect “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” The Government conceded that the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. Therefore, any such authority must derive from congressional delegation in IEEPA.

法院首先在宪法权力分配的框架下审视所主张的权力。法院强调，宪法将征收“税款、关税、进口税和消费税”的权力明确赋予国会。联邦政府也承认，总统在和平时期并无固有的关税权。因此，如果总统享有此类权力，只能来源于国会在《国际紧急经济权力法》中的明确授权。

Having fixed that baseline, the Court narrowed the interpretive inquiry to a textual question: whether Congress, in authorizing the President to “regulate … importation,” delegated tariff-setting authority.

在确立上述前提后，法院将争点归结为一个文本解释问题：国会在授权总统“监管……进口”时，是否同时赋予其设定关税的权力。

The Court first examined the statutory text. Section 1702(a)(1)(B) lists multiple distinct verbs authorizing investigation, blocking, nullification, prevention, or prohibition of transactions and importation. The Court observed that the statute does not mention “tariffs,” “duties,” or revenue-raising authority. It treated that omission as significant, because Congress typically confers tariff authority expressly and with defined limits.

法院首先审视了法条文本。第1702条(a)(1)(B)款列举了若干独立动词，授权总统对交易和进口进行调查、冻结、使其无效、阻止或禁止。法院指出，该条款并未提及“关税”“税费”或筹集财政收入的权力。这一缺失意义重大，因为国会在授予关税权时，通常会以明确条文作出规定，并设定具体的范围和限制。

Next, the Court interpreted the word “regulate” in context. It reasoned that statutory terms must be read in light of surrounding language. The verbs in IEEPA cluster around transaction control and sanction mechanisms rather than taxation. While tariffs may influence trade flows, they are a branch of the taxing power and operate as revenue exactions imposed on domestic importers. The Court therefore rejected the Government’s attempt to equate tariff imposition with regulatory control in the sense used in IEEPA.

随后，法院在具体语境中解释了“监管”（regulate）一词。法院指出，法条用语应结合前后文整体理解。《国际紧急经济权力法》所列举的各项动词，侧重于对交易实施控制或制裁，而非征税。尽管关税会影响贸易流向，但其性质属于征税权的行使，是对国内进口商征收的财政负担。因此，法院驳回了政府将征收关税等同于该法所称“监管”措施的主张。

The Court then addressed historical practice. It noted that in the decades since IEEPA’s enactment, Presidents have used it to block or prohibit imports and financial transactions, but none had invoked it to impose tariffs. The Court treated that absence of precedent as confirming that the statute was not understood to contain tariff authority.

随后，法院考察了历史实践。法院指出，自《国际紧急经济权力法》实施以来的数十年间，历任总统虽曾依据该法冻结或禁止进口及金融交易，但从未援引该法征收关税。法院认为，这种长期缺乏先例的事实进一步表明，该法一直未被理解为包含关税权。

The Court also rejected the argument that tariffs are simply a lesser included form of control relative to embargoes or prohibitions. It reasoned that tariffs are categorically distinct because they raise revenue and implicate Congress’s taxing power.

法院还驳回了“关税只是禁运或禁止措施的较轻形式管制”的观点。法院指出，关税在法律性质上与禁运或禁止措施截然不同，因为其具有筹集财政收入的功能，并直接涉及宪法赋予国会的征税权。

Finally, the Court clarified the scope of its holding. It did not attempt to define every permissible application of “regulate … importation,” but it held that the phrase does not encompass the power to impose tariffs of the type challenged.

最后，法院明确了判决的范围。法院并未全面界定“监管……进口”可能涵盖的所有情形，但明确指出，该表述不包括征收本案所涉类型关税的权力。

Justice Kagan agreed that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. She concurred in the statutory analysis but declined to join the portion of the opinion invoking the major questions doctrine. In her view, ordinary tools of statutory interpretation suffice to resolve the question. Once the text and structure are read in context, she concluded, the absence of express tariff language is dispositive.

卡根大法官（Justice Kagan）同意，《国际紧急经济权力法》并未授权征收关税。她认可多数意见对法条的解释分析，但没有加入有关“重大问题原则”的论述。在她看来，运用通常的成文法解释方法已足以解决本案。只要结合语境审视法条的文本与结构，就可以得出结论：条文中缺乏明确的关税授权语言，而这一点具有决定性意义。

Justice Jackson likewise agreed with the judgment that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. She emphasized adherence to conventional statutory interpretation and declined to rely on a heightened clear-statement framework. In addition to examining the statutory text and structure, she consulted IEEPA’s legislative history and concluded that nothing in the enacted materials reflects congressional intent to confer tariff authority.

杰克逊大法官（Justice Jackson）也同意判决结果，认为《国际紧急经济权力法》并未授权征收关税。她指出，本案运用传统的成文法解释方法即可得出结论，无需适用更为严格的“明确声明”规则。除分析法条文本和结构外，她还参考了该法的立法史资料，并认为其中并未体现国会有意赋予总统关税权。

Justice Kavanaugh framed the question differently. He reasoned that tariffs are historically recognized tools for regulating importation. From that premise, he concluded that the statutory phrase “regulate … importation” naturally includes tariff measures. He rejected the majority’s distinction between regulation and taxation, arguing that tariffs function as regulatory mechanisms in trade policy. He also emphasized the national emergency context and Congress’s decision to grant the President broad flexibility under IEEPA. On that reading, he would have upheld the President’s authority.

卡瓦诺大法官（Justice Kavanaugh）对问题的理解不同。他认为，关税历来是调控进口的重要工具，因此“监管……进口”在通常含义上应当包括征收关税。他不同意多数意见区分“监管”与“征税”，认为关税在贸易政策中本身就具有调控功能。他还强调，本案处于国家紧急状态背景下，而国会在《国际紧急经济权力法》中有意赋予总统较为广泛的裁量空间。基于这一理解，他主张维持总统的相关关税措施。

Justice Thomas dissented. He framed the case primarily as one concerning the scope of Congress’s legislative power under Article I and the proper limits of delegation. He questioned the majority’s characterization of tariff authority as exclusively confined absent explicit textual reference and argued that Congress may confer broad regulatory discretion consistent with the Vesting Clause. In his view, the statutory phrase “regulate … importation” is sufficiently capacious to include tariff measures, and he would therefore have upheld the President’s authority.

托马斯大法官（Justice Thomas）提出反对意见。他将本案界定为涉及宪法第一条下国会立法权范围及授权边界的问题。他质疑多数意见在缺乏明确文本时拒绝推定关税权的做法，认为只要符合“授予条款”（Vesting Clause）的结构安排，国会可以向行政机关授予广泛的监管裁量权。在他看来，“监管……进口”的表述足够宽泛，可以涵盖关税措施，因此应当维持总统的相关权力。

In the portion of the opinion joined by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett but not by a majority of the Court, the Chief Justice John Roberts addressed the case through the lens of the major questions doctrine.

该意见中有一部分由首席大法官罗伯茨撰写，并获得戈萨奇大法官和巴雷特大法官加入，但未形成多数意见。首席大法官从“重大问题原则”（Major Questions Doctrine）的角度对本案进行了分析。

He began by identifying the scope of authority asserted: unilateral presidential power to impose tariffs of unlimited scope and duration following a declared emergency. He characterized this as a transfer of a core congressional power of vast economic and political significance.

首席大法官首先指出，政府所主张的权力，是在宣布国家紧急状态后，总统可以单方面征收范围和期限均不受限制的关税。他认为，这实际上意味着将一项具有重大经济和政治意义的国会核心权力转移给行政机关。

From that characterization, he invoked the Court’s precedents requiring clear congressional authorization for extraordinary delegations. Because tariffs implicate the taxing power assigned to Congress, and because IEEPA contains no explicit reference to duties or revenue authority, the Chief Justice concluded that the statute does not clearly authorize such sweeping power.

基于这一界定，他援引最高法院既有判例，指出凡涉及重大影响的权力转移，必须有国会明确授权。鉴于关税关系到宪法赋予国会的征税权，而《国际紧急经济权力法》并未明确提及关税或筹集财政收入的权力，首席大法官据此认定，该法并未清晰授权如此广泛的行政权力。

He also rejected the argument that foreign-affairs context weakens the clear-statement requirement. In his view, the absence of inherent peacetime tariff authority makes clarity more, not less, necessary.

他还驳回了“外交事务背景可以降低明确授权要求”的观点。他认为，既然总统在和平时期并无固有的关税权，那么对国会授权的明确性要求只会更严格，而不会更宽松。

Justice Gorsuch joined the Chief Justice’s major questions analysis and elaborated on its constitutional foundation. He emphasized that the doctrine protects the separation of powers by ensuring that major policy decisions remain with Congress unless clearly reassigned.

戈萨奇大法官（Justice Gorsuch）加入了首席大法官关于“重大问题原则”的分析，并进一步说明其宪法基础。他指出，该原则旨在维护权力分立，确保重大政策决定仍由国会作出，除非国会以明确方式将该权力重新授权给行政机关。

Justice Barrett concurred separately to clarify her understanding of the doctrine. She treated the major questions principle not as an extra-textual super-canon but as an application of ordinary interpretive reasoning about how Congress communicates significant delegations. She agreed that no reasonable reading of IEEPA communicates a transfer of sweeping tariff authority.

巴雷特大法官（Justice Barrett）另行发表协同意见，澄清她对“重大问题原则”的理解。她认为，该原则并非脱离文本的“超级解释规则”，而是对通常解释方法的具体运用，即审视国会在作出重大授权时是否以清晰语言表达其意图。她同意，对《国际紧急经济权力法》的任何合理解释，都无法得出其将广泛关税权移交给总统的结论。

Justices Kagan and Jackson declined to rely on the major questions doctrine. They maintained that ordinary tools of statutory interpretation suffice to resolve the case and did not treat the doctrine as necessary to the judgment.

卡根大法官和杰克逊大法官未援引“重大问题原则”。她们认为，按照通常的成文法解释方法即可解决本案，无需将该原则作为裁判的必要依据。

Justice Kavanaugh rejected the application of the major questions doctrine. He viewed the statutory text as sufficiently clear and argued that the Court improperly imposed a heightened clarity requirement. In his view, Congress delegated broad authority in IEEPA, and the majority’s approach narrows that delegation beyond what the statute requires.

卡瓦诺大法官反对适用“重大问题原则”。他认为法条文本已足够清晰，法院不应提高对授权明确性的要求。在他看来，国会在《国际紧急经济权力法》中已赋予总统广泛权力，而多数意见实际上将这一授权限制到超出法条本身所要求的程度。

Justice Thomas did not join the Chief Justice’s major-questions analysis. Consistent with his broader structural concerns about legislative power and delegation, he rejected the need for a heightened clear-statement requirement and would have interpreted the statute to authorize the challenged tariffs.

托马斯大法官未加入首席大法官关于“重大问题原则”的分析。延续其一贯对立法权结构与授权界限的关注，他认为无须适用更严格的“明确声明”标准，并主张应将该法解释为授权征收本案所涉关税。

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President of the United States to impose tariffs based on its grant of authority to “regulate … importation.” Because tariff-setting in peacetime is not an inherent presidential power and because IEEPA contains no clear delegation of such authority, the challenged tariffs exceeded the statutory authority conferred by Congress. On jurisdiction, the Court held that challenges to the tariff measures arise out of laws providing for tariffs within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1581(i)(1) and therefore fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of International Trade. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirming the Court of International Trade was affirmed.

联邦最高法院最终裁定，《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）中授权总统“监管……进口”的条款，并不包括征收关税的权力。由于在和平时期征收关税并非总统的固有权力，而该法也未作出明确授权，相关关税措施因此超出了国会授予的权限。在管辖权方面，法院认为，对这些关税措施的挑战属于《美国法典》第28编第1581条(i)(1)款所规定的“因规定关税之法律而产生”的案件，应由美国国际贸易法院专属管辖。基于此，最高法院撤销了哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院的判决，并指示其以缺乏管辖权为由驳回案件；同时，维持了联邦巡回上诉法院确认国际贸易法院判决的裁定。

The decision of Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (2026) reinforces that tariff authority is a core legislative power under Article I and will not be inferred from broad regulatory language. The Court’s statutory analysis confirms that emergency statutes granting authority to “regulate” trade do not silently transfer revenue-raising powers absent express congressional direction. Although not joined by a majority, the Chief Justice’s major-questions analysis underscores that claims to sweeping executive authority over trade and revenue demand clear congressional authorization. More broadly, the case reflects the Court’s continued insistence that separation-of-powers limits are enforced through disciplined statutory interpretation when the Executive asserts authority that would substantially reallocate constitutionally assigned powers.

学习资源公司诉特朗普案（Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 2026）再次强调，关税权是宪法第一条赋予国会的核心立法权力，不能从笼统的监管性用语中推定得出。法院通过对法条的解释明确指出，即使紧急状态法律授权总统“监管”贸易，也不能在没有国会明确授权的情况下，理解为同时赋予其筹集财政收入的权力。虽然首席大法官关于“重大问题原则”的分析未形成多数意见，但该部分仍强调：当行政机关主张在贸易和财政领域行使广泛权力时，必须有国会清晰明确的授权。从更宏观的角度看，本案体现了最高法院的一贯的立场：当行政权的行使可能实质性改变宪法所确立的权力分配时，法院将通过严格的成文法解释，维护权力分立的宪法边界。