员工保密协议面临的新挑战

保密曾那么简单。只需将试图带着相关保密知识离开的人处死，中国就得以维持其在丝绸制造业的垄断地位长达几个世纪。十三世纪的威尼斯在为穆拉诺岛的玻璃制造商带去收益的同时也禁止他们离开该岛。波兰国王奧古斯都二世（Augustus the Strong）为了保护麦森瓷器的秘密，将作坊设立在一个偏远的城堡里并变相将工匠们囚禁其中。英国为了保护其在纺织品制造领域的卓越地位，也采取过类似的遏制策略。通过颁布 1774 年《机械出口法》，议会规定 "用于制造布匹的工具 "及其 "说明 "均不得出口。尽管这项法律被推定适用于那些掌握了相关知识的熟练工人，但并未能阻止一位雄心勃勃的年轻学徒塞缪尔·斯莱特，他悄悄离开英国，通过运用他所掌握的知识在殖民地发家致富，并种下了美国工业革命的种子。

要知道，斯莱特的行为不仅挑战了禁止技术出口的法律，也挑战了英国自 16 世纪以来发展成熟的学徒制度。1563 年的《学徒法规》（也称为 “工匠法规”，工匠指那些手工制品的成熟工人）规定，任何想进入某个行业的人都必须先做学徒工。这可不同于暑期实习。学徒工通常需要拜在师傅门下学习七年，而师傅对其进行培训的同时还提供食宿。虽然学徒“契约”与那种工人在一段时间内通过某种方式以换取利益（如一块土地）的常见契约合同在许多方面有相似之处，但学徒“契约”的重点在于获得培训。实际上，那时许多中产阶级家庭为了让自己 14 岁的儿子（女学徒相对较少）能够拜在一位备受尊崇的师傅门下，会支付一笔高昂的学费。

Apprenticeship indenture contracts tended to constrain the young worker in ways that their modern counterparts would likely find unacceptable. The apprentice had to “gladly obey” the master’s commands, forego “Cards, Dice or any other unlawful Game” and avoid “Ale-Houses, Taverns and Play-Houses” (that is, theaters). But we also see in them some of the same restrictive covenants that are common in modern employment agreements. The apprentice had to “keep the said Master’s Secrets,” and in many cases agree not to compete with the master for seven more years after expiration of the apprenticeship (the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623 set the term of a patent at 14 years; coincidence?)

那时的学徒契约合同往往以现代人无法接受的方式约束着年轻学徒工。学徒工必须 "欣然服从 "师傅的命令，放弃 "纸牌、骰子及任何其他非法游戏"，避开 "酒馆、旅馆和戏楼"（即剧院）。但我们也能从中看到一些现代劳动合同中常见的限制性条款。例如，学徒必须 "保守师傅的秘密"，并且在许多情况下，学徒工还必须同意在学徒期满后的七年内不与师傅竞争（1623 年英国《垄断法》规定专利权的期限为 14 年，巧不巧？）

When Slater traveled to New England, he was responding to an advertised market need for skilled artisans. In the same year that Britain barred the export of textile technology, its colonies had begun to offer bounties for textile workers willing to emigrate. Pennsylvania’s was first, at £100, and following independence most states offered amounts up to £500. In effect, these were the signing bonuses of the nascent industrial revolution. Fast forward to today, when very skilled artificial intelligence professionals can command salaries of as much as $900,000. In an economy fueled by the expanding horizons of innovation, money talks and talent walks.

斯莱特前往新英格兰，正是响应了市场对熟练技工的需求。在英国禁止纺织技术出口的同一年，英国的殖民地开始为愿意移民的纺织工人提供赏金。宾夕法尼亚州是第一个提供赏金的州，赏金金额是100 英镑；大多数州独立后都提供了高达 500 英镑的奖金。实际上，这就是新兴工业革命的签约奖金。时至今日，技术精湛的人工智能专业人士已能够索要高达90 万美元的薪水。在创新驱动的经济发展中，金钱主导人才流动。

人才流动过程中，企业招聘环节面临的风险与挑战在于是否会受到其他企业信息的污染。关于这一问题，我们此前在其他文章中讨论过。眼下，我们聚焦于企业如何让自己的员工尊重并保护其企业数据资产的完整性。在此，我们需要先区分两种限制性协议：（1）在劳动关系结束后的一段时间内禁止竞争（即“竞业限制”）和（2）禁止使用或披露用人单位的商业秘密（即“保密”或“不披露”协议）。

Noncompete agreements have always been controversial to some extent. Employers like them because they avoid messy litigation over whether the employee has breached confidentiality; a noncompete eliminates the risk as a practical matter. But it is a blunt instrument, preventing fair as well as unfair competition. At a macro level, a few states, notably including California, long ago decided that noncompetes are anathema in an open economy. Some people point to the extraordinary story of Silicon Valley to argue the wisdom of this policy. Indeed, Minnesota has just jumped on board, and a growing number of other states have limited noncompetes to high-earning executives.

竞业限制协议一直存在着一定程度的争议。用人单位喜欢竞业限制协议，因为它可以规避因员工违反保密义务而引发的棘手的诉讼；竞业限制协议在实践中也确实消除了此类风险。但它是一把双刃剑，在阻却不公平竞争的同时也妨碍了公平竞争。在宏观层面上，包括加利福尼亚在内的几个州早已判定：竞业限制协议是开放型经济中的绊脚石。有人以硅谷的非凡故事来论证这一政策的明智。事实上，明尼苏达州刚刚加入了这一行列，同时，越来越多的州已经限制了竞业限制协议对高收入管理者的适用。

In contrast, employee confidentiality agreements have almost universally been embraced by courts, even though they usually operate in perpetuity to restrain use or disclosure of information. This is mainly because even without a contract, the common law recognized a duty of confidentiality by all employees to respect the trust implied by having access to secrets. In that context, the contract is not necessary to create the obligation, although it certainly is helpful, because it provides evidence of the confidential relationship and notice to the employee. As a result, employee confidentiality agreements are ubiquitous in most industries.

与此相反，尽管员工保密协议对于信息使用或披露的限制期限通常是永久的，却几乎得到了法院的普遍支持。这主要是因为，即使没有合同，法律也承认所有员工都负有保密义务。员工能够接触企业商业秘密是基于企业的信任，该种信任应当被尊重。在这种情况下，虽然保密义务的产生不依赖于保密协议，但保密协议在证明双方建立了保密关系，以及用人单位已经告知员工负有保密义务方面是很有用的。因此，员工保密协议普遍存在于在大多数行业。

建立了保密关系并不等于保密能够落到实处。在一个重视劳动力自由流动的社会中，用人单位希望确保对其商业秘密的独家控制权与员工跳槽自由（甚至是跳到有直接竞争关系的单位）间确实可能存在利益冲突。我们用以缓解该冲突的方式是设立规则来保障员工跳槽后可以继续使用他们此前积累的技能及常识。如此一来，员工自身的技能与知识就能不断扩充且能随其流动。但是，越来越多的立法机构和政府机构颁布了更明确支持劳动力流动的政策。

In the negotiations that led to the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 （DTSA）, a provision was inserted that restricted the ability of judges to issue injunctions against departing employees. Courts may not prevent someone from accepting a job, and any restrictions they impose on what an employee can do must be based on evidence that misappropriation is likely, but “not merely on the information the person knows.” Technically, the statute does not limit the applicability of confidentiality agreements, but it can make more challenging the company’s attempt to enforce them in ways that are effective to protect secrets.

在 2016 年联邦《保护商业秘密法》（DTSA）的谈判过程中，一项条款被插入其中以限制法官对离职员工发布禁令。法院不得阻止某人接受某项工作，而且法院要对员工行为施加任何限制都必须有证据证明盗用商业秘密的行为可能发生，而 "不能仅仅是基于该人所知道的信息涉密"。准确地说，该法规并未限制保密协议的适用，但它使公司试图采取有效措施落实保密协议以保护其秘密变得更具挑战。

More recently, the Federal Trade Commission has proposed a rule that would ban noncompetes nationally but would also apply to any employee confidentiality agreement “written so broadly that it effectively precludes the worker from working in the same field.” [1]

最近，联邦贸易委员会提议在全国范围内禁止竞业限制协议。该提案也适用于"写得过于宽泛，以至于员工无法再在同一领域工作"的员工保密协议。几个月前，我们研究了这项提案，虽然它可能不会作为一项具有强制执行力的法规发布，但它与各州为约束竞业限制协议所做的努力不谋而合。

无论你对竞业限制协议持何种立场，在这场争论中令人担忧的是：有人用同样宽泛的笔触将保密协议描绘成对员工流动性的威胁。不仅是政府在坚持这一立场，法院也如此。在第一巡回上诉法院审理的2020年 TLS Management 诉 Rodriguez-Toledo 上诉案中，用人单位主张其前员工违反保密协议使用了其专有技术，下级法院支持了用人单位（一家税务咨询公司）的主张。该上诉法院推翻了这一判决，理由是："过于宽泛的保密协议虽然没有明确禁止员工入职与前用人单位有竞争关系的单位，但在限制竞争方面与竞业限制条款引发了同样的政策关切，本案中，保密协议具有阻止被告与原告竞争的效果"。

This willingness to analyze nondisclosure agreements as if they were noncompete contracts presents a serious conundrum for businesses. Imposing nondisclosure agreements on employees is a key feature of most companies’ information security programs; indeed, the law’s requirement that the employer engage in “reasonable efforts” to protect its trade secrets often starts with looking at where such agreements are in place. If you don’t have them, you risk losing your rights. And when you create them, you can’t know exactly what information the employee will be exposed to over the years of employment. As a result, the definition of “confidential information” in the contract necessarily will be very broad, with the details to be filled in by on-the-job training and experience.

这种将保密协议当作竞业限制协议来分析的倾向让企业犯难了。与员工签订保密协议是大多数公司实施了信息安全计划的一个关键特征。事实上，审查用人单位是否签订了此类协议往往是判断其是否尽到了法律所要求的"合理努力 "以保护商业秘密的第一步。如果没有签订保密协议，企业会面临败诉的风险。而当企业拟定协议时，又难以预见员工在多年的工作中会接触到哪些信息。因此，保密协议中对 "保密信息 "的定义必然会非常宽泛，具体细节则由在职培训和经验来填补。

So, what is the employer supposed to do? First, avoid trying to claim that everything the employee learns on the job belongs to the company. The language of the contract in TLS Management was so expansive that it arguably swept up information that was generally known, making the employee radioactive in terms of litigation risk. As a test, make sure to read the agreement in a way that ensures there is a path forward for the honest worker who just wants to get another job. Second, accept that there is no way in the modern world to make yourself whole for having released into the market someone whom you have endowed with the skillset to compete with you. Get over that annoyance. And third, focus on the risks to your specific secrets by engaging in a meaningful exit process.

[1]译者注:美国当地时间2024年4月23日，美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）发表新规，禁止“non-compete clause”，具体参见https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/ftc-announces-rule-banning-noncompetes。

*本文由北京天驰君泰律师事务所国际业务专业委员会高级合伙人朱尉贤律师、合伙人寇海侠律师审校。